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The Texas Supreme Court case of Johnson v. Darr,1 the first case decided in any state
by an all-woman appellate court, was a singular event in American legal history.
On January 9, 1925, three women lawyers appointed by Texas Governor Pat Neff met
at the state capitol in Austin to issue rulings solely on one case involving conflicting claims
to several residential properties in El Paso. The special court was appointed because the
three elected justices recused themselves over a conflict of interest involving one of the
litigants, a popular fraternal organization called Woodmen of the World. The special
court granted the writ of error to enable the appeal, heard oral arguments on January 30,
issued its decision on May 23, and disbanded on June 12 after denying a motion for
rehearing. It would take fifty-seven years, 1982, before another woman was appointed to
the court, and ten more years, 1992, before the first woman was elected to the court.
After 1925, and particularly after women became ubiquitous as attorneys during and
after the 1980s, Johnson v. Darr was noted as a curious oddity and celebrated milestone
in the history of women in the legal profession.
The following Article was presented at the annual meeting of the Texas State
Historical Association on March 6, 2004, in Austin, Texas. The paper’s objective is
to examine the circumstances that led to Governor Neff’s appointments, his motivations
in appointing the women, and the legal legacy of the substantive result of the decision.
The paper has been cited many times and with this publication is now more easily
accessible. Except for a few edits, corrections, and the addition of new case citations in
the appendix, the paper is published as it was presented in 2004.2

1. Johnson v. Darr, 272 S.W. 1098 (Tex. 1925).
2. Among the articles citing this paper are Linda C. Hunsaker’s Family Remembrances and the Legacy
of Chief Justice Hortense Sparks Ward, J. TEX. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y, Summer 2015, at 54, and
Alice G. McAfee’s The All-Woman Texas Supreme Court: The History Behind a Brief Moment on the Bench,
39 ST. MARY’S L.J. 467 (2008). McAfee’s article relied extensively on this paper but took a different
approach by analyzing the case as a chapter in the expansion of the status of women in Texas law and
politics. See generally id. (discussing the all-woman Supreme Court in the context of the women’s
movement). In recent years, the case has been featured in a living history format. A reenactment of
the oral arguments was held at Baylor Law School in 2015 and at the State Bar of Texas annual meeting
in Fort Worth in 2016. Elizabeth Furlow, Reenactment of Johnson v. Darr Marks the Ninetieth Anniversary of
the Historic All-Woman Texas Supreme Court, J. TEX. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y, Spring 2015, at 72; David A.
Furlow, All-Woman Court Ruled the State Bar Annual Meeting, J TEX. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y, Summer 2016,
at 82; see also David A. Furlow & Lynne Liberato, History Revisited: The 1925 All-Woman Court Will Be
Reenacted at the State Bar of Texas Annual Meeting, 79 TEX. B.J. 357, 358 (2016). In January 2021, Texas
Court of Appeals (Fourteenth District) Justice Ken Wise brought the story of Johnson v. Darr to a wider
audience by featuring the case on his Texas history audio podcast. Ken Wise, Wise About Texas:
The Texas History Podcast—Episode 96: The All-Woman Supreme Court (Jan. 31, 2021), wiseabouttexas.com
/ep-96-the-all-woman-supreme-court/ [perma.cc/HY55-8DGV].
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I. GOVERNOR PAT M. NEFF APPOINTS THREE WOMEN-ATTORNEYS
TO THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT
On March 8, 1924, Chief Justice Calvin M. Cureton of the Texas
Supreme Court certified to Governor Pat M. Neff that he and the court’s
two associate justices, Thomas B. Greenwood and William Pierson, were
disqualified to consider the application for writ of error in a lawsuit brought
by J.M. Darr and others against W.T. Johnson and others for tracts of land
in El Paso County.3 The judges had an impermissible interest in the case
because the Darr parties brought the suit as trustees for the fraternal
beneficiary association known as the Woodmen of the World.4 All three
justices were members of the association and therefore proportionate
owners of the association’s assets.5 Chief Justice Cureton’s certification of
disqualification required Governor Neff to replace the justices
“immediately” with appointees who met the three requirements set forth in
the State Constitution.6 At the time, the Texas Constitution required each
candidate be a citizen of Texas and the United States, at least thirty years
old, and a practicing Texas lawyer or judge of a state court for at least seven
years.7 The appointees would sit as a special court to consider the writ of
error application solely with respect to this case and, if granted, rule on the
legal issues presented to the court.8

3. Mary G. Ramos, The Texas All-Women Supreme Court, TEX. ALMANAC, https://www.texas
almanac.com/articles/the-texas-all-woman-supreme-court [perma.cc/U93R-GHUN].
4. See Darr v. Johnson, 257 S.W. 682, 682 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1923, writ granted) (“Action by
J.M. Darr and others, as trustees for the Woodmen of the World . . . .”).
5. Debbie Mauldin Cottrell, All-Woman Supreme Court, HANDBOOK OF TEX. ONLINE
(Nov. 1, 1994), https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/all-woman-supreme-court [perma.cc
/D4HL-W5BE].
6. Id.
7. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1891).
8. Ramos, supra note 3; see Neff Names Three Texas Women to Function as Special Supreme Court,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 2, 1925, at 1 (explaining what the women appointed are to do in respect
to the case). In 1925, the Texas Supreme Court consisted of one “chief justice” and “two associate
justices.” TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1512. The Texas Constitution provides, “No judge shall sit
in any case wherein the judge may be interested . . . .” TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11. The implementing
statute contained nearly identical wording disqualifying the judge “in any cause wherein he may be
interested in the question to be determined . . . .” TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1516. When the
Supreme Court found itself disqualified to hear and determine a case, the disqualification was certified
to the governor, “who shall immediately commission the requisite number of persons learned in the
law for the trial and determination of such cause . . . .” TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11 (1891); see also TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1516 (establishing the disqualification of judges in a statutory format). This
disqualification language remains in effect today. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11.
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Neff took no action to fill the special court until January 1, 1925, just one
week before the scheduled January 8 hearing on the application.9 Acting
through his assistant secretary, John H. Johnson, Neff stunned the legal
community and the people of Texas by announcing that the special court
would consist of three women: Mrs. Edith E. Wilmans of Dallas,
Miss Nellie Robertson of Granbury, and Mrs. Hortense Ward of
They would be the first women to sit on the
Houston.10
Texas Supreme Court and the first all-woman appellate court in the United
States.11 What followed was a media frenzy and rare public glimpse into
how the Texas Supreme Court dispensed with applications for writs of
error. Newspapers vied with each other to provide as much detail as
possible on this history-making announcement.12
Research indicates there were less than seventy-five women lawyers in
Texas between 1910 and 1930, with even fewer meeting the qualifications
for appointment in 1924.13 After the appointments had been announced,
Mrs. Emma R. Webb, Bastrop County’s only woman lawyer, made known
that she had been asked to serve on this court, but was disqualified because
of her affiliation with the Woodmen Circle, a women’s auxiliary of
Woodmen of the World, and, according to one account, because of her
9. Ramos, supra note 3.
10. Id.
11. JAMES L. HALEY, THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT: A NARRATIVE HISTORY, 1836–1986,
at 168 (2013).
12. See Neff Names Three Texas Women to Function as Special Supreme Court, supra note 8, at 1
(describing the first all-woman Supreme Court, who it is to be composed of, and what they were to
decide).
13. Elizabeth York Enstam, Women and the Law, TEXAS STATE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION,
https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/women-and-the-law [https://perma.cc/F5YJ-XH
M9]; see HALEY, supra note 11, at 168 (“[F]or beyond this five, there were only about two dozen more
female lawyers in Texas to choose from.”). The University of Texas Law School graduated sixteen
women between 1920 and 1924 out of 376 graduates during the same period. See UT School of Law
Class Composites 1884–1959, TARLTON LAW LIBRARY, https://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/classcomposites/1920s [https://perma.cc/9NE5-ZHFP] (listing UT law graduating classes from 1880s
through 1950s). At the time, the Texas Constitution provided in relevant part, “No person shall be
eligible to serve in the office of chief justice or associate justice of the Supreme Court unless he be, at
the time of election, a citizen of the United States and of this State, and unless he shall have attained
the age of thirty years, and shall have been a practicing lawyer or a judge of a court or such lawyer and
judge together at least seven years.” TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1891). The implementing statute had
nearly identical wording. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1514 (“No person shall be eligible to the
office of chief justice or associate justice of the [S]upreme [C]ourt, unless he be, at the time of his
election, a citizen of the United States and of this state, and unless he shall have attained the age of
thirty years, and shall have been a practicing lawyer or a judge of a court in this state, or such lawyer
and judge together, at least seven years.”).
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husband’s membership in the Woodmen order.14 During the week
preceding the hearing, Governor Neff learned that announced appointees,
Wilmans and Robertson, also were not qualified, thus causing him to
scramble for replacements.15 In both instances, Neff appointed women to
take their places.
Edith Wilmans, one of the three initial appointees, was a well-known
participant in the women’s suffrage movement. In 1922, she became the
first woman elected to the Texas legislature.16 When Wilmans learned of
her appointment, she “accepted at once[,]” telling the Dallas Morning News:
“I think it is a great honor to the womanhood of Texas that the Governor
should select three women as members of a special court. Every day it is
being demonstrated that woman’s capacity to serve is recognized and her
opportunities are multiplying.”17 Her appointment, however, was shortlived. One of the lawyers in the legal department of the Woodmen of the
World discreetly contacted Dallas judge Royall R. Watkins and mentioned
to him that Wilmans had not been practicing law long enough to satisfy the
seven-year minimum requirement under the State Constitution.18
On January 3, Judge Watkins notified Governor Neff of this conference
in a letter he labeled “purely personal and confidential.”19 Evidently
recognizing Neff’s objective to appoint an all-woman special court,
Judge Watkins recommended two Dallas women to be her replacement:
Mrs. Sarah C. Menezes and Miss Hattie Henenberg.20 He was profuse in
his praise for Mrs. Wilmans and assured the governor that her
disqualification from the honor he conferred on her “will not hurt you.”21
Shortly thereafter, Wilmans learned of the problem with her nomination
and on Sunday night, January 4, she announced to the press that she was
disqualified and had forwarded her resignation to Governor Neff.22 She
14. Neff Names Three Women to Supreme Court, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Jan. 2, 1925, at 1.
15. HALEY, supra note 11, at 168.
16. Neff Names Three Women to Function as Special Supreme Court, supra note 8, at 1; Edith Eunice
Wilmans Malone, Wilmans, Edith Eunice Therrel (1882–1966), HANDBOOK OF TEX. ONLINE
(Jan. 15, 2017), https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/wilmans-edith-eunice-therrel [perma.
cc/F9KM-GK7W].
17. Neff Names Three Texas Women to Function as Special Supreme Court, supra note 8, at 1.
18. Letter from Watkins to Neff (Jan. 2, 1925) (The Texas Collection at Baylor University).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Mrs. Wilmans Finds She Is Ineligible to Serve on State Supreme Court, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Jan. 5, 1925, at 1 (reporting on Mrs. Wilmans resignation the morning after she learned the
news).
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told the Dallas Morning News that she was just two months shy of satisfying
the seven-year practice requirement.23 Governor Neff received the letter
from Judge Watkins “just at the proper time,” and on Monday, January 5,
he appointed Hattie Henenberg to replace Wilmans.24 The Dallas Morning
News reported that Henenberg was “recommended by a number of
attorneys of the Dallas bar, including six women lawyers.”25 Henenberg,
who was 31 years old, graduated from the Dallas School of Law—
the precursor to SMU law school—and was licensed in Texas in 1916.26
A strong advocate for providing legal assistance to the poor, Henenberg told
a journalist at the time of her appointment that “from birth to death, the
poor man is the prey of petty swindlers.”27 She said, “[A] legal aid society
does not give charitable support to needy persons, but only justice and the
enforcement of just and honorable claims.”28
Mrs. Wilmans’ resignation was followed by the disqualification of another
initial appointee, Nellie Robertson, for the same reason.29 At the time,
Robertson was serving as the county attorney for Hood County, the only
elected woman county attorney in the state.30 However, she was forced to
resign from the Supreme Court appointment because she had been
practicing law for only six years and nine months—three months shy of the
constitutional minimum.31 On January 7, just one day prior to the
scheduled hearing in Austin, Neff appointed Miss Ruth Virginia Brazzil of

23. Id.
24. Letter from Neff to Watkins (Jan. 15, 1925) (The Texas Collection at Baylor University);
Dallas Woman Named on Special Tribunal, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 6, 1925, at 1.
25. Dallas Woman Named on Special Tribunal, supra note 24.
26. Sherilyn Brandenstein, Henenberg, Hattie L. (1893–1974), HANDBOOK OF TEX. ONLINE
(Jan. 1, 1995), [hereinafter Henenberg] https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/henenberghattie-l [https://perma.cc/CS9Q-VST4].
27. Alyson Drake, March Madness (3/9/2018)-Bella Abzug v. Hattie Leah Henenberg, TEX. TECH L.
LIBR. (Mar. 3, 2018), https://texastechlawlibrary.com/2018/03/09/march-madness-3-9-2018-bellaabzug-v-hattie-leah-henenberg/ [https://perma.cc/B55E-KY4T].
28. Id. Henenberg died on November 28, 1974. Miss Henenberg, Law Pioneer, Dies, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Nov. 29, 1974, at 11B; Memorials, 38 TEX. B.J. 183, 186 (1975).
29. Another Woman on High Court Bench, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 8, 1925, at 1; HALEY,
supra note 11, at 167; Caitlin Marks, Robertson, Nellie Gray (1894–1955), HANDBOOK OF TEX. ONLINE
(June 13, 2017), https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/robertson-nellie-gray [perma.cc/8R
6N-FDT2].
30. Marks, supra note 29.
31. Neff Names Three Women to Function as Supreme Court, supra note 8, at 1; New Chief Justice is Texas
College Graduate, HOUSTON POST DISPATCH, Jan. 5, 1925, at 10; Another Woman on High Court Bench,
supra note 29; HALEY, supra note 11, at 167; Marks, supra note 29.
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Galveston as Robertson’s replacement.32 He made Brazzil and Henenberg
Special Associate Justices and elevated his remaining appointee,
Hortense Ward, to Special Chief Justice.33 Brazzil, 35 years old, was born
in Tyler and lived in Wharton before moving to Galveston in 1918.34
She was a quiet, private person who became a “special student” in law at the
University of Texas.35 She passed the bar exam in 1912.36 Brazzil opposed
women’s suffrage. Around the time of her appointment, Brazzil said that
“there is little chance of the majority of our public offices ever being filled
by women. There are too many men well qualified, for that, and, as a rule,
the average woman has more exacting, and, to her, more absorbing duties
than those of a political nature.”37 Nonetheless, she did not oppose
women’s entry into politics and said that she hoped it “will mean the
enactment of better State laws looking to the protection of working women
and children, and particularly the children.”38 Brazzil was not married at
the time of her appointment, but in December 1927 she married Roy
Roome.39 Although the marriage apparently lasted six to ten days,
she retained her married name of Ruth Roome for the rest of her life.40
Hortense Ward, age 52, was the only initial appointee who survived
scrutiny of her qualifications.41 Ward was a divorcee with three young
daughters when she married lawyer William Ward in 1908.42 In 1910, after
taking a correspondence course in Houston, she became one of the first
women to receive a law license in Texas.43 She joined her husband in
practicing law and their firm became known as Ward & Ward.44 In 1913,
32. Another Woman on High Court Bench, supra note 29.
33. Id.
34. Sherilyn Brandenstein, Roome, Ruth V. Brazzil (1889–1976), HANDBOOK OF TEX. ONLINE
(June 1, 1995), https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/roome-ruth-v-brazzil [perma.cc/6G
ND-WZEK].
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Ramos, supra note 3.
38. John William Stayton, The First All-Woman Supreme Court in the World, HOLLAND’S
MAGAZINE, March 1925, at 73.
39. Brandenstein, supra note 34.
40. Sue M. Hall, The 1925 All-Woman Supreme Court of Texas 14 (1978) (unpublished paper)
(on file with St. Mary’s University School of Law); Brandenstein, supra note 34. Ruth Brazzil Roome
died in Kerrville in 1976. Id.
41. See Ramos, supra note 3 (stating Ward was born in 1875).
42. Hortense Sparks Ward (1875–1944), TARLTON LAW LIBRARY, https://tarltonapps.law.
utexas.edu/justices/profile/view/112 [perma.cc/L2GM-MF9K].
43. Id.
44. Id.
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she assisted in the preparation and passage of the “Married Woman’s
Property Rights Law,” which gave married women in Texas greater control
over their separate property.45 In 1915, she became the first woman in
Texas and the South to be admitted before the United States Supreme
Court.46 Ward supported prohibition and women’s suffrage.
On June 27, 1918, as president of the Harris County Equal Suffrage
Association, she became the first woman to register as a voter in Harris
County.47 One of her daughters married attorney John H. Crooker, one of
the founding partners of the Houston law firm of Fulbright & Jaworski.48
The special appointments to consider the writ of error in Johnson v. Darr
were among Governor Neff’s last official acts.49 After winning election as
governor in 1920, Neff became an outspoken crusader and moralist, and
one of the most colorful Texas politicians of the 20th century.50 He was a
deeply religious Baptist with undergraduate and master’s degrees from
Baylor University and a law degree from the University of Texas.51 Neff
possessed outstanding oratory skills and a homespun personality. He is
often remembered for his strong advocacy of women’s suffrage and
prohibition, particularly the enforcement of prohibition laws in effect during
his service as governor.52 According to Neff’s friend and Baylor classmate,
U.S. Senator Tom Connally, “Pat never drank anything stronger than

45. Id.
46. Id.; Janelle D. Scott, Ward, Hortense Sparks (1872–1944), HANDBOOK OF TEX. ONLINE
(Nov. 1, 1995), https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/ward-hortense-sparks [perma.cc/L3
9S-S6RW].
47. Scott, supra note 46.
48. Hall, supra note 40, at 3–10; see also Scott, supra note 47 (“Her son-in-law, John H. Crooker,
was a partner in the law firm of Fulbright and Crooker, which grew into the prominent Houston firm
of Fulbright and Jaworski.”). Ward died December 5, 1944, in Houston. Id.; Memorials, 8 TEX. B.J.
580, 585 (1945). For an excellent summary of Ward’s life, see Hunsaker, supra note 2, at 51.
49. See Cottrell, supra note 5 (“On January 1, 1925, shortly before his term as governor ended,
Neff officially named three women to serve on the special court . . . .”).
50. See Thomas E. Turner, Neff, Pat Morris, HANDBOOK OF TEX. ONLINE (Mar. 9, 2019),
https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/neff-pat-morris [perma.cc/PF7J-4J6G] (“Viewed by
many as a crusader and a moralist, he immediately put his campaign issues before the legislature.”).
51. See id. (discussing his involvement in Baptist organizations such as the Baptist General
Convention of Texas as well as the Southern Baptist convention).
52. See id. (describing the contrast between his main opponent for Governor, Joseph Weldon
Bailey, and himself in regard to issues including, women’s suffrage, prohibition, and a majority of the
Progressive era agenda).
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Brazos River water.”53 Neff was handily re-elected in 1922 to his second
term, which ended January 17, 1925, less than three weeks after his
appointment of the special all-women court.54
Neff was succeeded in office by Miriam Ferguson, the wife of former
Governor James Ferguson, who was impeached and removed from office
in 1917.55 Mrs. Ferguson was creating women’s history in her own right by
becoming the first woman governor of Texas.56 She missed being the first
woman governor of any state by only a few days after the honor was taken
by Wyoming’s Nellie Ross.57 Much attention was given to the pending
inaugurations of the two women, but the all-woman Texas Supreme Court
was creating a sensation of its own in the first two weeks of 1925.58
II. THE ALL-WOMAN COURT CONSIDERS THE APPLICATION
FOR WRIT OF ERROR
Hortense Ward, Hattie Henenberg, and Ruth Brazzil met each other for
the first time in Governor Neff’s office at the state capitol on Thursday
morning, January 8.59 Few details of the event were overlooked by the
press. One journalist wrote that the appointees were “no freak affair, but a
tribunal thoroughly competent to sit in judgment and reach a conclusion
just as sound as a decision might have been with all the Mr.’s since Adam
stacked behind it.”60 Another wrote the three women “were a good deal

53. Ex-Governor Pat Neff Dies of Heart Attack, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Jan. 21, 1952, at 12;
Neff served on the Texas Railroad Commission from 1929 to 1932, and as president of Baylor
University from 1932 to 1947. Id. He died in Waco in 1952. Turner, supra note 50.
54. Turner, supra note 50.
55. John D. Huddleston, Ferguson, Miriam Amanda Wallace [Ma], HANDBOOK OF TEX. ONLINE
(June 29, 2019), https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/ferguson-miriam-amanda-wallacema [perma.cc/3RH5-3RUR]; Ralph W. Steen, Ferguson, James Edward, HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE
(Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/ferguson-james-edward [perma.cc/
K96A-KZ7D].
56. Cottrell, supra note 5.
57. Huddleston, supra note 55.
58. Id.
59. Ramos, supra note 3.
60. Allie Morris & Austin Bureau, Only All-Woman Texas Supreme Court Panel a Rarity in 1925—
and Today, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS (Dec. 31, 2017), https://www.expressnews.com/news/
local/article/Only-all-woman-Texas-Supreme-Court-panel-a-rarity-12465000.php [https://perma.cc/
EST6-TYLR].
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better looking than the Supreme Court which regularly deliberates on the
third floor of the capitol.”61
Governor Neff gave the women their commissions, complete with gold
embossed seals, before they were escorted to the Court’s consultation room
and greeted by Chief Justice Cureton, Judges Greenwood and Pierson,
court attachés, and more newspaper reporters, all of whom were men.62
When Judge Cureton administered the oath, the women did not raise their
hands.63 They smiled when he got to the part on whether they had ever
fought a duel.64 The reporter for the Dallas Morning News noted that Brazzil
signed the oath with her left hand, while Ward and Henenberg signed with
their right hand.65
Judge Cureton instructed the special justices on the decision they had to
make with respect to the application for writ of error.66 He handed them
three rubber stamps marked “granted,” “refused,” and “dismissed.”67
By granting the writ, the attorneys for the parties would have to prepare
briefs and argue the case for an opinion from the Court. By refusing or
dismissing the writ, their service would end, and the civil appeals opinion,
which favored the Woodmen of the World trustees, would stand. After
deliberating for twenty minutes, the women emerged and took their places
At 11:30 in the morning,
behind the Court’s bench.68
Special Chief Justice Ward told the audience: “Application No. 13371,
61. Id. In 1925, the court met on the third floor of the north wing of the Texas state capitol.
See Ramos, supra note 3 (describing the first meeting of the special all-women Supreme Court);
Texas Supreme Courtroom, TEX. STATE PRES. BD. (Aug. 2015), https://tspb.texas.gov/prop/tc/tcspaces/spaces05.html [perma.cc/FQT5-QE7B] (describing “the third floor north wing” as the setting
in which the Supreme Court used to meet). A separate building, dedicated solely for the court’s use,
was not constructed until 1959. Id.
62. Ramos, supra note 3; Barbara Bader Aldave, Women in the Law in Texas: The Stories of Three
Pioneers, 25 ST. MARY’S L.J. 289, 292 (1993); Court of Women Gives Decision, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Jan. 9, 1925, at 1.
63. Aldave, supra note 62.
64. Court of Women Gives Decision, supra note 62; Ramos, supra note 3.
65. Court of Women Gives Decision, supra note 62.
66. Id.
67. See Richard Morehead, Texas Had One All-Woman Court, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 3,
1955, at 2 (describing the stamps given to Mrs. Ward by Judge C.M. Cureton, each indicating a
different ruling).
68. See Sentiments of Women Judges Are Outlined, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Jan. 9, 1925, at 17
(expressing the “fact that it required only 20 minutes for the women to come to a decision to grant the
writ of error does not indicate any hasty action . . . .”); see also Court of Women Gives Decision, supra note 62
(“[T]he special court took the case in consultation, and within less than an hour had agreed to grant
the application.”).
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W.T. Johnson et al., from El Paso County, for writ of error, is granted and
the
cause
set
for
argument
Jan[uary] 30,
1925.”69
Ward then turned to F.T. Connerly, clerk of the court, and announced:
“I think that is all, except to have our pictures taken.”70 The photo of the
three women at the bench appeared in newspapers across the state the next
day.71 After a short reception with their women friends in attendance, they
left Austin and returned on January 30th to hear oral arguments.72
III. THE WOODMEN TRUSTEES CONVEY TITLE, BUT RETAIN A TRUST
Johnson v. Darr involved a dispute between a judgment creditor and
trustees for a Woodmen of the World camp located in El Paso.73 In 1921,
the Tornillo Camp No. 42, Woodmen of the World, held fee simple title to
all or part of five residential lots located in the City of El Paso.74 The lots
were worth about $10,000.75 Title to the lots was in the name of J.M. Darr,
W.S. Barnes, H.A. Borcherding, and F.P. Jones, as trustees for the camp.76
On August 24, 1921, the trustees executed a general warranty deed
conveying title to the properties to one of the trustees, F.P. Jones.77
Contemporaneously with the delivery of the deed, Jones executed an
instrument in favor of the other camp trustees acknowledging that he was
holding title to the property as trustee for the camp and would reconvey the
title at their request.78 The general warranty deed was recorded in the
El Paso County deed records, but the trust instrument was not recorded
until later.79

69. Court of Women Gives Decision, supra note 62.
70. Id.; Sentiments of Women Judges are Outlined, supra note 68.
71. See Special Woman’s Supreme Court of Texas, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 10, 1925, at 8
(displaying a photo taken after the special court granted the writ).
72. Women Justices Grant Error Writ in W.O.W. Case, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, Jan. 9, 1925,
at 9; see also Sentiments of Women Judges are Outlined, supra note 68 (quoting Hortense Ward: “The fact that
it required only twenty minutes for the women to come to a decision to grant the writ of error does
not indicate any hasty action . . . . On the contrary, she said, it means that the case will be determined
only after exhaustive study.”)
73. Johnson v. Darr, 272 S.W. 1098, 1098 (Tex. 1925).
74. Darr v. Johnson, 257 S.W. 682, 683 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1923, writ granted).
75. Neff Names Three Texas Women to Function as Special Supreme Court, supra note 8, at 1.
76. Darr, 257 S.W. at 683.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See id. (stating the instrument was not recorded until October 24, 1922).
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In June 1922, Jones was sued by W.T. Johnson and others for an unpaid
personal debt.80 At the time of the suit, Johnson had no notice or
knowledge of the claimed trust in favor of the camp.81 In December 1922,
Johnson obtained a large money judgment against Jones and an attachment
order directing the sale of the lots to satisfy the judgment.82 One of the lots
in question was possessed by tenants, but the others were unimproved.83
The Woodmen trustees filed suit against Johnson to declare his creditor
lien void as against those lots and to enjoin the trial court’s order for the
attachment lien sale.84 The trial court distinguished between the lot
occupied by tenants and the unimproved lots, holding the creditor lien void
as to the occupied lot, but effective as to the other lots, apparently because
the trust instrument had not been recorded.85 The Woodmen trustees
appealed the decision arguing the attachment lien sale should not proceed
against any of the lots.86
The El Paso Court of Civil Appeals agreed with the Woodmen trustees
and reversed the trial court’s ruling.87 In a decision rendered on
December 6, 1923, the court concluded that the trust instrument signed by
Jones was not a conveyance, but a mere declaration of trust, and therefore
was not required to be recorded under the state registration statute.88
The registration statute applied only to conveyances of land.89 The court
also held the judgment lien did not attach to the unoccupied lots because
the “the attaching creditors . . . acquired no more interest in the lands than
Jones had.”90 Jones only had bare legal title, while the Woodmen trustees
held an equitable interest through an unrecorded trust.91 The decision,
however, was not unanimous.92 Judge Higgins argued in his dissent that
the trust instrument was evidence of an unrecorded conveyance, and
therefore, the instrument had to be recorded under the registration statute
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 684.
Id. at 682.
Id. at 684.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 684–85.
Id. at 684.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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for it to be binding on third parties.93 Judge Higgins contended that the
majority’s decision was based on common law, but that common law was
changed with the adoption of the registration statutes.94
The special Texas Supreme Court issued an opinion affirming the civil
appeals court opinion on May 23, 1925.95 Judge Hortense Ward, writing
for the court, indicated that the issue to be decided in the case was whether
an unrecorded trust instrument, creating an equitable title in real property,
was a conveyance that fell within purview of state registration laws requiring
the recordation of conveyances of real property, and if not, whether an
attachment lien creditor can prevail against equitable owners of the
property.96
Judge Ward held the unrecorded instrument in favor of the Darr parties
(the Woodmen trustees) created a trust in the land, which meant their deed
to Jones passed only naked legal title while they retained equitable title for
themselves.97 Moreover, the trust instrument was not a conveyance of
title.98 “[U]nder no rational rule of construction,” she wrote, “can [the trust
instrument] be regarded as a conveyance or passing of an estate in land.”99
Given that the trust agreement was not a conveyance of land, it was not
within the purview of the registration statutes, and for this reason did not
require recordation to be effective. Regarding a judgment creditor’s claim
to the property against the unrecorded equitable owner’s claim, Judge Ward
wrote case precedent had clearly established “that attachment lien creditors
acquire[d] no greater interest in the land than” the interest owned by the
judgment debtor at the date of the levy absent a statute abrogating the
common law rule.100 After discussing several relevant decisions,
Judge Ward found that where the doctrine of estoppel applied, outside the
93. Id. at 685.
94. Id. at 684–85. The registration statute at the time of the decision can be found at Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. art. 6626 (1911), but is now codified at Texas Property Code, Section 13.001 (“Effects of
Recording”).
95. Johnson v. Darr, 272 S.W. 1098, 1102 (Tex. 1925); see also Supreme Court of Women Files First
Opinion, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, May 23, 1925, at 2 (“There was little formality. The three
women solemnly took their places, the judgment was announced, and the court then recessed until the
judgments could be entered in the minutes. The court then reconvened, and after approving the
minutes, the three women signed them, thus leaving on permanent record evidence of the first Supreme
Court in the world composed exclusively of women.”).
96. Johnson, 272 S.W. at 1099.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1100.
99. Id. at 1099.
100. Id.
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recording statutes, a third party could prevail against an unrecorded
equitable title, such as situations involving a bona fide purchaser without
notice who gave value.101 However, when a third party, such as an
attachment lien creditor, cannot assert the doctrine of estoppel, the
equitable title will prevail.102 Not finding estoppel present in this case, the
Court held for the Darr parties and affirmed the civil appeals court
decision.103
Judge Brazzil wrote a concurring opinion emphasizing that equitable
titles are not affected by the registration statutes, and therefore, the failure
to record the trust instrument did not impair the rights of the attaching lien
creditor.104 The relationship of the parties was not affected by the
registration of the deed to Jones.105 Therefore, she wrote: “[T]he creditors
have lost nothing by said transaction; there is no injury to prevent and no
wrong to redress.”106 Judge Henenberg also wrote a concurring opinion,
concluding that “the attaching creditor is left with the right he had at
common law, and can claim as against such unrecorded instrument only the
actual interest of Jones at the time of the levy.”107 Following consideration
and denial of a motion for rehearing on June 12, 1925, the special court
ceased its purpose and disbanded.108 Remarkably, even the perfunctory
denial of the rehearing motion did not escape media attention.109
IV. WHAT WERE GOVERNOR NEFF’S MOTIVES?
Prior to the 1970s, articles about the case revealed little other than its
oddity in Texas jurisprudence because of the sex of the judges who decided
the case. Hattie Henenberg wrote about the case in the August 1932 issue
of the Women Lawyer’s Journal, but the article is largely confined to her
participation on the court. Henenberg asserted that the decision was “[t]he
leading case on the application of registration statutes to equitable titles[,]”
101. Id. at 1099–1102 (concluding, after review of precedent, the doctrine estoppel could allow
a third party to prevail over an unrecorded equitable title).
102. Id. at 1100.
103. Id. at 1102.
104. Id. (Brazzil, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 1103.
106. Id.
107. Id. (Henenberg, J., concurring).; see Austin Bureau, Woodmen Win in Court of Women, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, May 23, 1925, at 1 (stating Judge Henenberg wrote a concurring opinion in the case).
108. See Women Judges of High Court Deny Rehearing Plea, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, June 12,
1925, at 24 (stating the Court convened on June 12, 1925 and denied Johnson’s motion for rehearing).
109. Id.
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and that the court was “the first appellate court in the history of the country
to be entirely composed of women.”110 Other articles mentioning the
decision include an article appearing in the Dallas Morning News in 1955 and
another in the Southwestern Historical Quarterly in 1956 on the history of civil
courts in Texas.111 The latter referred to the case merely as a “unique
chapter in Texas judicial history . . . .”112
In the early 1970s, with growing presence of women in the legal
profession, Johnson v. Darr emerged with a new perspective in historical
literature as a milestone event. One of the more remarkable stories
published at the time was written by Dean Moorhead in the February 11,
1973 issue of the Texas Star Magazine, a Sunday insert issued with the Houston
Post.113 Moorhead wrote that during the hiatus between Governor Neff’s
notification of the sitting court’s disqualification in March 1924, and the
women’s appointment on January 1, 1925, he was diligently searching for men
to fill the special court, but was frustrated in his inability to find qualified
men without ties to Woodmen of the World:
[Neff] apparently made numerous attempts to secure men to serve as special
justices. According to the late H.L. Clamp—a tall, thin and most delightful
gentleman who was Deputy Clerk of the Supreme Court for 51 years (from
1902 to 1953)—each time the Governor offered an appointment to a
prominent male member of the Bar, the attorney would respond by saying
that he too belonged to the Woodmen of the World and was also disqualified.
Finally, in frustration, Governor Neff decided to appoint three attorneys who,
because of their sex, could not possibly be members of that organization.114

With few exceptions, nearly every subsequent writing on the case quickly
seized upon this colorful anecdote. For example, an article entitled Women
in the Law published in the Texas Bar Journal in April 1974, mentioned the
110. Hattie L. Henenberg, Women of the Supreme Court of Texas–Johnson v. Darr, 19 WOMEN
LAW.’S J. 16, 16 (1932).
111. See Morehead, supra note 67 (“While no woman has served regularly on the Texas Supreme
Court, an all-female court once decided a case.”); Leila Clark Wynn, A History of the Civil Courts in Texas,
60 THE SOUTHWESTERN HISTORICAL QUARTERLY 1, 11, July 1956 (“A unique chapter in Texas
judicial history was added in January of 1925. Governor Pat Neff appointed Hortense Ward,
Hattie L. Henenberg, and Ruth V. Brazzil to the only all-woman court which ever sat in Texas, or
perhaps in any other state.”).
112. Wynn, supra note 111, at 11–12.
113. See generally Dean Moorhead, Texas’ All-Woman Supreme Court, TEXAS STAR, Feb. 11, 1973,
at 13 (describing the events leading up to Neff’s appointment of the special court).
114. Id.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

15

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 53 [2022], No. 2, Art. 3

424

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:409

“famed ‘Petticoat Supreme Court’” appointed by Governor Neff, and stated
that the three elected justices “and all otherwise qualified men were WOW
members and could not hear the suit.”115 The author concluded: “In a
stroke of desperation or genius, the Governor appointed Hattie Henenberg
of Dallas and Ruth Brazzil of Galveston as associate justices, and
Mrs. Hortense Ward of Houston as special chief justice.”116 The story was
repeated in a special article on women lawyers appearing in the January 1982
issue of the Texas Bar Journal.117 In this article the presumed political muscle
of Woodmen of the World was introduced into the lore of the case:
The case concerned the property rights of Woodmen of the World, a fraternal
order with so much political influence that practically every office-holder in
the state found it expedient to become a member. Members of the bar as well
as public officials had come under its spell. One after another, every male
attorney had to refuse appointment as a special justice because of his
membership. In this dilemma, Gov. Neff chose the solution of appointing
women lawyers.118

Norman D. Brown, in his authoritative 1984 book on Texas politics in the
1920s, Hood, Bonnet and Little Brown Jug, relied on Moorhead’s conclusions:
“Neff apparently made many attempts to secure men as special justices, but
each time he offered an appointment to a prominent male member of the
bar, the attorney declined because he too belonged to the Woodmen of the
World.”119
Karen Berger Morello in The Invisible Bar: The Woman Lawyer in America,
1638 to the Present, wrote in 1986 that Governor Neff “was forced to appoint
a special three-member court composed of women attorneys—the only
lawyers in the area who were not members of the fraternal organization.”120
In 1993, Barbara Aldave, Dean and Professor of Law at St. Mary’s School
of Law, writing in the St. Mary’s Law Journal, cited the earlier articles in
concluding that “virtually all other male lawyers who were qualified to serve
115. Women in the Law, 37 TEX. B.J. 325, 327 (1974).
116. Id.
117. See generally Marian O. Boner, Women and the Law in Texas, 45 TEX. B.J. 44 (1982) (discussing
the challenges and triumphs of women in the law in Texas).
118. Id. at 45.
119. NORMAN D. BROWN, HOOD, BONNET, AND LITTLE BROWN JUG: TEXAS POLITICS,
1921–1928, at 156–57, (Robert A. Calvert and Larry D. Hill eds., 1984).
120. KAREN BERGER MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR: THE WOMAN LAWYER IN AMERICA,
1638 TO THE PRESENT 235 (1986).
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as judges were Woodmen, too[,]” and that Neff, “[m]aking the most of his
limited options . . . [,] appointed a special three-woman panel to decide
Johnson v. Darr.”121 In October 1996, the Texas Bar Journal again published
an article stating that “[b]ecause most male lawyers—and all three Supreme
Court justices—in Texas bought insurance and sought political influence
through Woodmen of the World, one barrister after another disqualified
himself from judging the case. Lame-duck Gov. Pat Neff reluctantly made
feminist history.”122
The story of Governor Neff facing the frustrating problem of
failing to find qualified men was repeated in the Texas Almanac editions of
1998–1999 and 2002–2003:
During the following 10 months [after March 8, 1924], Neff evidently
attempted to find male judges or attorneys to sit on the special court.
However, according to H.L. Clamp, the Deputy Clerk of the Supreme Court
from 1902 to 1953, each time Neff offered an appointment to a male judge
or attorney, the lawyer responded that he, too, was a member of the WOW,
and therefore was disqualified from serving.123

The Handbook of Texas, an authoritative encyclopedic work published by
the Texas State Historical Association, provided additional fuel to this
anecdote:
Governor Neff, however, found it difficult to name suitable replacements
quickly. Beginning in March 1924, when the court disqualified itself, he made
numerous attempts to find justices for the special court, but discovered, with
increasing frustration, that each prominent male attorney he approached was
also a member of the Woodmen. Ultimately, Neff decided that he would
appoint women attorneys to the special court, as the Woodmen was a
male-only organization and females would be safe from disqualification. . . .
[T]he use of female justices was not common, and Neff resorted to it only
after determining that he simply would not be able to appoint qualified men
to the court.124

Does the evidence support the anecdote attributable to Deputy Clerk H.L. Clamp,
as reported by Dean Moorhead in his 1973 article? On January 2, 1925, the Dallas
121.
122.
123.
124.

Aldave, supra note 62, at 291 (footnote omitted).
Hollace Weiner, A Case When Women Reigned Supreme, 59 TEX. B.J. 890, 890–91 (1996).
Ramos, supra note 3.
Cottrell, supra note 5.
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Morning News reported that Governor Neff had called Clamp to ask him if
he thought the appointments of the women would be legal.125 “Mr. Clamp
opined that probably they were if all eligibility rules were observed, which
would require a minimum of seven years’ practice of the legal profession
and having reached the age of 30 years.”126 Nothing was reported,
however, about Neff’s alleged search for qualified men or that women were
chosen only because men without conflict of interest could not be found.
It is possible Clamp told Moorhead the story as he remembered it, and
there might be some truth to it, but Clamp would have been an unlikely
confidante of Neff’s appointment process. There is no indication in the
archival files of the case, or in Neff’s papers at Baylor University, to indicate
that Neff ever asked any male attorney to serve on this court. The
documentary evidence suggests the delay in making the appointments was
the result of Neff’s procrastination on these and over one hundred other
appointments toward the end of 1924 because of his distractions with
political campaigns and the Democratic National Convention held that year.
The source for Neff’s procrastination as the reason for his delayed
appointments can be found in two letters discovered in the case file in the
Texas State Library archives. On November 24, 1924, the attorneys for
Johnson wrote to F.T. Connerly, the clerk of the Texas Supreme Court and
Clamp’s superior, inquiring about the status of the writ application.127
Connerly responded on December 1 stating the three justices had recused
themselves by certification to the Governor on March 8, and that the
Governor “appears to have overlooked the matter” by not appointing
special justices.128 Connerly advised them to notify the Governor that the
appointment of a special court was required.129 Whether they contacted
the Governor is not clear because the next correspondence in the case file
is a letter dated January 1, 1925, from Governor Neff’s assistant secretary
announcing the appointment of three women lawyers as special justices.130
Although newspaper reports of the appointments promptly mentioned that

125. Neff Names Three Texas Women to Function as Special Supreme Court, supra note 8, at 1.
126. Id.
127. Armstrong & Morrow to Connerly, Nov. 24, 1924 (Johnson v. Darr case file at Texas State
Archives).
128. Connerly to Armstrong & Morrow, Dec. 1, 1924 (Johnson v. Darr case file at Texas State
Archives).
129. Id.
130. Johnson to The Texas Supreme Court, January 1, 1925 (Johnson v. Darr case file at Texas
State Archives).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol53/iss2/3

18

Dunn: The Legacy of Johnson v. Darr

2022]

THE LEGACY OF JOHNSON V. DARR

427

Mrs. Emma Ward was one of the preferred appointees—before finding
herself disqualified—no newspaper reports searched for this study mention
that any men were ever considered.
Was the Woodmen of the World organization so popular that Governor Neff could
not find a qualified non-member male attorney? The answer is no. Woodmen of
the World was a popular mutual life insurance company with membership
open only to men.131 The size of the company made litigation inevitable,
but Johnson was neither the first nor the last time Texas judges had to face
recusal in a case involving the organization. The precedent was established
in 1909 when the Texas Court of Civil Appeals held a trial court’s opinion
had to be reversed because the judge, who held an insurance policy issued
by Woodmen of the World and was a member of the organization, was
disqualified under state law to hear and determine a case involving the
organization as a party.132 Governor Neff, prior to facing the special
appointments in Johnson v. Darr, had already appointed special justices to
hear and determine three other cases involving Woodmen of the World,
including Hutcherson v. Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World,133 decided
April 20, 1923, Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World v. Ayres,134 decided
April 25, 1924, and Wirtz v. Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World,135 decided
January 12, 1925. Wirtz was decided only four days after the women in
Johnson v. Darr granted the writ of error application.136 All three of the other
Woodmen of the World special courts appointed by Neff were composed
entirely of men.137 Male attorneys also were appointed special justices in
two Woodmen of the World cases heard in 1927.138 There is no indication
131. See WoodmenLife’s Storied History, WOODMENLIFE, https://www.woodmenlife.org/about/
history/ [https://perma.cc/D29T-8APH] (describing the backstory of the fraternal organization).
132. Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World v. Hale, 120 S.W. 539, 539 (Tex. 1909).
133. Hutcherson v. Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World, 251 S.W. 491 (Tex. 1923).
134. Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World v. Ayres, 261 S.W. 1000 (Tex. 1924).
135. Wirtz v. Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World, 268 S.W. 438 (Tex. 1925).
136. See Cottrell, supra note 5 (stating the all-woman supreme court met and granted the writ on
January 8, 1925); Hold Fraternal Firms Have Power to Make Reasonable Increases, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Jan. 13, 1925, at 3 (recapitulating the decision of the all-male Special Supreme Court in Wirtz on
January 12, 1925).
137. Hutcherson, 251 S.W. at 491, 494 (opinion issued by Special Associate Justice George S.
King, and dissenting opinion by Special Associate Justice J.W. Madden); Ayres, 261 S.W. at 1000
(opinion issued by Special Chief Justice I.W. Stephens); Wirtz, 268 S.W. at 438, 439, 443, 444 (opinion
issued by Special Chief Justice Norman G. Kittrell, with Special Associate Justice W.C. Woodward
concurring, and Special Associate Justice Charles Black concurring by separate opinion).
138. Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World v. Patton, 295 S.W. 913, 914 (Tex. 1927);
Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World v. Boden, 1 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. 1927).
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that qualified men were difficult to find for any of the Woodmen of the
World special courts appointed in the cases between 1923 and 1927, or that
women attorneys were considered for appointment in any of the cases
except Johnson v. Darr.
The observation that Moorhead (or Clamp) could be wrong was raised in
an essay prepared in 1978 by Assistant Professor of Law Sue M. Hall of
St. Mary’s University Law School.139 While asserting that Neff probably
experienced “some initial difficulty in finding men to fill the posts,” she
concluded nonetheless that the “theory [raised by Moorhead] . . . is in all
likelihood not correct.”140 Hall’s article was never published and not relied
upon, apparently, in any subsequent articles with the notable exception of a
piece by Murphy Givens in the Corpus Christi Caller-Times.141 In the article
written about the special court on April 5, 2000, Givens concluded that
Neff’s motive in taking the unusual step of appointing the women was never
made clear, but that he “could easily have found male lawyers who were not
members of the Woodmen of the World.”142
The weight of authority points to the conclusion that Neff was not
seeking women out of frustration or desperation after failing to find
qualified men to appoint. Not only is the anecdote based on hearsay
emerging in print for the first time nearly fifty years after the court did its
work, but it is also demeaning to the three women who were selected.
The appointments can hardly be considered a landmark achievement for
women lawyers if the appointees obtained their commissions only because
no qualified man could be found. What makes the case meaningful is that
the women were appointed even though many well-qualified men were
available to serve.
Was Neff motivated to appoint women for political advantage? The evidence
suggests not. Neff certainly courted the female vote and was a strong
supporter of women suffrage, but by the end of 1924 his political career was
finished, and he knew it. The apex of his career was mid-1924 when he was
promoted by his supporters as a Texas favorite-son candidate for the

139. Hall, supra note 40, at 2 (1978).
140. Id. Hall incorrectly states that Miriam Ferguson defeated Neff for re-election. Id. at 23.
Neff and the Fergusons never faced each other in an election.
141. Murphy Givens, All-Woman Supreme Court Made History, CORPUS CHRISTI CALLER-TIMES,
Apr. 5, 2000, at 11.
142. Id. Givens relied on information furnished by State Bar archivist Angela Dorau and
Sue Hall’s essay. Id.
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Democratic nomination for president.143 He could have appointed the
women as early as March 1924, when it would have had political impact, but
he did not do so. His appointments came nearly two months after the
November general election and only a few weeks before his farewell
address.144 On January 20, 1925, at the Ferguson inauguration, only days
after the court’s hearing, Neff publicly stated his intention of retiring to
private life.145
Was Neff motivated to pay tribute to Mrs. Ferguson as the first woman governor of
Texas? Likely not, but possibly. An article in the Austin American-Statesman
published on January 2, 1925, stated that Neff gave no reason for the
appointments, but that the appointments “were considered not only a high
tribute to the women lawyers named, but also to the incoming woman
governor of Texas.”146 Sue Hall accepted this reasoning in part in her
paper, concluding that Neff was likely making “a gesture of welcome to
Texas’s first woman governor by the public recognition of the fact that other
competent women were also available for public service, even to becoming
chief justice and associate justices of the highest court in the state.”147
The relationship between Neff and the Fergusons was cordial, but not
effusive. Both were Democrats, but Neff did not endorse Miriam either
before or after she received the Democratic nomination for governor. Neff
remained silent through election day. These appointments may have been
his way of stealing some of the limelight surrounding her pending
inauguration. There is evidence, however, of a conflict with respect to other
appointments. In early January 1925, Neff sent a large number of recess
143. Turner, supra note 50.
144. See Ramos, supra note 3 (“Not until Jan. 1, 1925, only a week before the case was scheduled
to be heard, did Neff finally appoint the special justices . . . .”); United States Presidential Election of 1924,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/United-States-presidentialelection-of-1924 [perma.cc/7UN5-WCMA] (“United States presidential election of 1924, American
presidential election held on November 4, 1924 . . . .”); see generally GOVERNOR PAT M. NEFF, Farewell
Address, in THE BATTLES OF PEACE 267–270 (1925) (addressing the Texas Legislature and Texas
citizens).
145. GOVERNOR PAT M. NEFF, supra note 144, at 269 (“I am retiring today to the sylvan shades
of private life. I am going back to take my place amidst the rank and file of the people, where the great
heart of humanity beats.”); see BROWN, supra note 119, at 253 (stating the inauguration occurred on
January 20, 1925). Four years later he emerged again as a public figure by serving on the Railroad
Commission of Texas from January 1, 1929 to January 1, 1933. Railroad Commissioners Past Through
Present, RRC, https://www.rrc.texas.gov/about-us/commissioners/commissioner-list/ [https://
perma.cc/HU6D-2AUT].
146. Neff Names Three Women to Supreme Court, supra note 14.
147. Hall, supra note 40, at 2.
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appointments to the Texas Senate in what some described as a potential
“show down” with Ferguson’s nominations for the same posts.148
The Texas Senate confirmed a few of Neff’s appointments before
These last-minute
Ferguson’s inauguration on January 20th.149
appointments were not a polite way to welcome your successor.
In assessing Governor Neff’s motives, a glance at his personality is
helpful. Neff was an unusual man with an abundance of sincerity and
sentimentality. His record and actions in office suggest that his motive in
appointing the three women might very well have been the obvious one:
a genuine interest in advancing the status of women in state government for
its own sake, and to encourage the notion that greater participation among
women in state government would benefit the state. Neff had made it his
policy to name one or more women to serve on every state board, including
university regent positions, and was the first Texas governor to appoint a
woman as the governor’s private secretary.150 It would have been no great
leap for him to have extended this policy to judiciary appointments, even if
the step he took with these appointments affected only one case.
The symbolic message of his all-woman Supreme Court appointments is
underscored by the fact that he was dogmatic in appointing women for
this case even after suffering the embarrassment of learning that his
preferred appointee, Emma Webb, was disqualified.151 The embarrassment
continued as two more of his announced appointees, Edith Wilmans and
Nellie Robertson, discovered they too were disqualified only days after their
appointments had been announced publicly.152 It made no difference to
Neff who received the recognition so long as the honor was received by
women.153 This attitude is supported by comments he made in a letter he
wrote on January 9 to Nellie Metcalfe of the Texas Woman’s Chamber of
Commerce: “I am in hopes that this recognition of the womanhood of the

148. See BROWN, supra note 119, at 256 (describing the Senate’s treatment of Neff’s swell of
final appointments).
149. Ralph W. Steen, Governor Miriam A. Ferguson, 17 EAST TEX. HIST. J., 3, 9 (1979) (“As is
customary, the Senate confirmed some of the Neff appointees and rejected some of them.”).
150. Ramos, supra note 3; BROWN, supra note 119, at 156.
151. Betty Trapp Chapman, Rough Road to Justice: The Journey of Women Lawyers in Texas, J. TEX.
SUP. CT. HIST. SOC., Summer 2015, at 78.
152. See Ramos, supra note 3 (describing Wilmans’s and Robertson’s resignations due to not
meeting the requisite seven years of law practice).
153. See Perhaps They are Portias, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 10, 1925, at 14 (questioning
Neff’s appointment of women solely because they are women).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol53/iss2/3

22

Dunn: The Legacy of Johnson v. Darr

2022]

THE LEGACY OF JOHNSON V. DARR

431

State as attorneys will be helpful in many ways to those women, wherever
they may be, who are fighting single-handed the battles of life.”154
Was Neff cautious in appointing women to the special court for legal reasons?
Possibly. The issue of whether women were eligible for public office had
been considered but not decided until Miriam Ferguson’s run for governor
in 1924.155 Her husband, James Ferguson, was not only impeached as
governor in 1917, but also banned by the Texas Senate from seeking office
again.156 Nonetheless, in 1924 he was anxious to vindicate his name and
make a political comeback by positioning himself as the foremost opponent
of the then-powerful Ku Klux Klan movement.157 Early that year, he
announced his intention to place his name on the ballot as a candidate for
governor in defiance of the 1917 ban on his ability to hold office.158
John Maddox and others promptly filed suit against him and members of
the Democratic State Executive Committee.159 In the trial court, the
plaintiffs obtained an injunction restraining the committee from placing his
name on the ballot.160 Ferguson appealed to the court of civil appeals, but
that court side-stepped the matter and certified several questions to the
Texas Supreme Court.161 In a decision rendered on June 12, 1924, the
Court held that Ferguson’s impeachment proceedings were valid and the
Texas Senate had the power and jurisdiction to render judgment
disqualifying him from holding any state office.162 This ended any doubt
as to James Ferguson’s ability to run for governor again.163

154. Neff to Metcalfe, January 9, 1925 (The Texas Collection at Baylor University).
155. See BROWN, supra note 119, at 105–06 (stating Miriam Ferguson withdrew her name from
the United States Senate ballot prior to voting); Id. at 3–4 (“In 1924, Mrs. Miriam A. Ferguson, a
housewife and other, made a successful race for governor of Texas as a proxy for her husband . . . .”).
156. Id. at 4 (“Governor James E. Ferguson . . . was barred from holding state office by his
impeachment conviction of 1917 . . . .”).
157. See id. at 215–17 (discussing James Ferguson’s run for governor of Texas against the
Ku Klux Klan despite his 1917 impeachment).
158. Id. at 216.
159. Ferguson v. Maddox, 263 S.W. 888, 888 (1924).
160. Id. at 888–89.
161. Id. at 888.
162. Id. at 893.
163. See id. at 892–93 (answering the certified question as to whether the judgement decreeing
James Ferguson unqualified to hold any office in Texas invalid in the negative). Chief Justice Cureton
and Associate Justice Greenwood certified to the Governor that they were disqualified to sit as judges
in this case. Id. at 888. Governor Neff appointed Alexander Coke as Special Chief Justice and
Howard Templeton as Special Associate Justice. Id.
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Ferguson solved this problem by placing his wife’s name on the ballot.
Miriam Ferguson, known as “Ma” Ferguson, in contrast to her husband’s
“Pa” Ferguson nickname, made it clear that if she was elected, her husband
would be her close advisor, if not her surrogate.164 Mrs. Ferguson’s name
appeared on the ballot for the Democratic primary, and at the election held
on July 26, 1924, she received 20.83% of the vote, coming in second behind
Ku Klux Klan supporter Felix D. Robertson, who received 27.52% of the
vote, forcing a runoff.165 In the runoff election, held August 23, 1924, she
won convincingly with 56.7% of the vote.166
Her victory ended Robertson’s political career and marked the beginning
of the end for the Ku Klux Klan’s influence in Texas politics. However, it
did not end the legal challenges to her candidacy. The legitimacy of a female
governor was raised by Charles M. Dickson, a resident of Bexar County, in
a lawsuit he brought against Miriam and James Ferguson,
Secretary of State J.J. Strickland, and the county judges, clerks, and sheriffs
of every county in the state.167 Certified questions again reached the Texas
Supreme Court, this time only weeks before the November election.
Among other things, Dickson claimed that Miriam Ferguson was ineligible
to hold office because she was a woman, a married woman, and the wife of
James Ferguson who himself was ineligible to hold office.168 One of the
arguments raised was “that the words ‘he’ and ‘his’ are used in [S]ection 4
of [A]rticle 4 [of the state constitution] in defining the Governor’s
qualifications.”169 The Court issued an opinion upholding Ferguson’s
candidacy, noting that on this issue “depends the right of all women to hold
office in Texas under the present Constitution[,]”170 and that “[s]ince we
have no English word, which in the singular number, includes both ‘he’ and
‘she,’ the most appropriate word under common usage, to include both
sexes while using the singular number, is the word ‘he’. . . . That ‘he’ must
include ‘she’ is obvious . . . .”171 The Court also recognized the role of the
suffrage amendments making women qualified electors, concluding that
164. See BROWN, supra note 119, at 225 (discussing Miriam Ferguson’s acknowledgement of her
husband as a guide through her governorship).
165. TX Governor-D Primary, OUR CAMPAIGNS, https://www.ourcampaigns.com/RaceDetail.
html?RaceID=296490 [https://perma.cc/K6YY-XSF6].
166. Id.
167. Dickson v. Strickland, 265 S.W. 1012, 1012–13 (Tex. 1924).
168. Id. at 1013.
169. Id. at 1021.
170. Id. at 1019.
171. Id. at 1021.
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their status as such “removed any pre-existing sex ineligibility to office.”172
The Court remarked,
[I]t is to blind one’s eyes to the truths of current history not to recognize that
the last vestige of reason to sustain a rule excluding women from office was
removed when she was clothed with equal authority with men, in the
government of state and nation, through the ballot. When the reason for the
rule of exclusion has failed, the rule should no longer be applied.173

The decision in Dickson was issued on October 15, 1924.174 Seventeen
days later, on November 4, Ferguson was elected governor over her
Republican opponent with nearly 59% of the vote.175
The provisions of the state constitution concerning the qualification of
Supreme Court justices also used “he” and “his” terminology.176
If Governor Neff had any doubts about the legality of women appointees
to the Supreme Court because of their gender, the Dickson decision removed
them. Thus, the duly elected Texas Supreme Court deserves some credit in
laying the groundwork for the appointment of the all-woman court. Johnson
v. Darr was Neff’s first (and last) opportunity, following Dickson, to appoint
women jurists without having to face a court challenge based on gender
qualification. There is no indication that anyone questioned the legality of
Neff’s appointees merely because they were women.
V. THE LEGAL LEGACY OF JOHNSON V. DARR
If Governor Neff’s objective was to pave the way for additional women
appointments to Texas courts, his effort was a failure. No future governor
would take this step until James V. Allred appointed Sarah T. Hughes to a
state district court position in 1935.177 Another woman would not sit on
the Texas Supreme Court until 1982, when Governor Bill Clements

172. Id. at 1023.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1012.
175. TX Governor-D Runoff, supra note 165.
176. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1891) (“No person shall be eligible to the office of chief justice
or associate justice of the Supreme Court unless he be, at the time of his election, a citizen of the United
States . . . .”).
177. See Aldave, supra note 62, at 292 (1993) (reflecting on the decade that passed between the
Johnson v. Darr decision and Governor James Alfred appointing Sarah T. Hughes as the first full-time
judge in Texas).
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appointed Ruby K. Sondock to fill a vacancy.178 Ten years later, in 1992,
Justice Rose Spector became the first woman elected to the Court.179
Other women did not serve on the court until 1998 and subsequent
years.180
Nonetheless, the decision in Johnson v. Darr was not forgotten in the law
books. The question of whether the decision rendered by the all-woman
court had any lasting legal significance can be found in subsequent case law,
including nearly forty cases that have cited or followed at least one of the
substantive points of the decision.181 These cases cite Johnson v. Darr for
the principle that equitable interests in real property are valid even if not
recorded in county deed records absent estoppel, an attaching lien creditor
acquires no greater interest in land than that owned by the debtor except
when abrogated by statutes, or that recording statutes are in derogation of
the common law and therefore must be strictly construed.182 In a few cases
the decision is cited in the context of judicial recusals, but only as dicta.183
Citations to these cases are compiled in the appendix.
It is noteworthy that only one case mentions the composition of the court
after citing the case for substantive legal precedent.184 All of the other cases
citing Johnson v. Darr for legal precedent do not mention that the jurists were
women, which is perhaps the greatest compliment.185 Their legal
reasoning, and not the fact that women rendered the decision, is the
enduring legal legacy of Johnson v. Darr.

178. Id. at 299; Woman Named to Texas Supreme Court, 45 Tex. B.J. 1156, 1156 (1982).
179. Aldave, supra note 62, at 299.
180. Judith N. McArthur, Women and Politics, HANDBOOK OF TEX. ONLINE (1976),
https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/entries/women-and-politics [https://perma.cc/S32A-MY
YD].
181. See infra Appendix (listing cases that have cited Johnson v. Darr).
182. See infra Appendix (listing cases that have followed Johnson v. Darr substantively).
183. See infra Appendix (listing cases that have cited Johnson v. Darr in respect to judicial recusal).
184. See Tex. Indus. Accident Bd. v. Indus. Found. of the S., 526 S.W.2d 211
(Tex. Civ. App—Beaumont 1975, writ denied) (highlighting the substantive holding and remarking in
a footnote that it was the only case in Texas jurisprudence to be decided by an all-woman Supreme
Court of Texas) (citing Johnson v. Darr, 272 S.W. 1098 (Tex. 1925)).
185. See infra Appendix (listing cases citing Johnson v. Darr, which do not mention that jurists
were women).
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APPENDIX
CASES MENTIONING OR FOLLOWING JOHNSON V. DARR
(1925 to 2021)186
Year

Federal Cases

1932

Del Rio Bank & Trust Co. v. Cornell, 57 F.2d 142 (5th Cir.
1932). “Under the recording laws of Texas the equitable title of
the appellant to the omitted land was not required to be
recorded in order to protect it against creditors of the bankrupt
in whose favor an attachment or an execution on a judgment
against the bankrupt was issued[,]” citing Johnson v. Darr.
Id. at 143.

1936

Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Turner, 14 F. Supp. 495 (N.D. Tex. 1936).
Citing Johnson v. Darr for the proposition that it was immaterial
that a trust agreement was not recorded.

1953

In re Rogal, 112 F. Supp. 712 (S.D. Cal. 1953). “Under the
recording laws of Texas the equitable title of the appellant to the
omitted land was not required to be recorded in order to protect
it against creditors of the bankrupt in whose favor an attachment
or an execution on a judgment against the bankrupt was
issued[,]” citing Johnson v. Darr. Id. at 717–18.

1986

Prewitt v. United States, 792 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1986). Ruling
that “a divorce decree cannot be a ‘conveyance’ as contemplated
by the statute. Since recording statutes are in derogation of
common law principles, long established Texas doctrine
recognizes that they should be narrowly construed,” citing
Johnson v. Darr. Id. at 1356.

186. This listing of cases updates the citations mentioned in the original 2004 paper.
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1997

Mueller v. United States, No. 96-20419, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
42566, at *10 n.10 (5th Cir., 1997). The court cites to Johnson v.
Darr as additional authority for a quote from a 1990 Texas civil
appeals court opinion: “[i]t is well settled that ‘the superiority of
[an equitable] title may be asserted against a judgment lien holder
even though he had no notice of the equitable title at the time
of fixing his lien.’”

2004

Bank of Am., N.A. v. Schwartz (In re Hayes), No. SA-03-CA1228-XR, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25208 (W.D. Tex. 2004).
The court quotes Johnson v. Darr: “[t]he decisions of this state
uniformly hold that the registration statutes do not apply to
equitable titles” and “[t]hat bona fide purchasers for value are
protected against the assertion of [an unrecorded equitable title]
is because of the doctrine of estoppel, and not the registration
statutes.” Id. at *15–16.

2007

Pierce v. Howard (In re Sedona Cultural Park, Inc.), No. AZ-061339-MoPaBr., 2007 WL 7540968 (9th Cir. 2007). Quoting
from the Blalak case (cited below) and its citation to Johnson v.
Darr for the proposition that an equitable interest need not be
recorded to prevail over a subsequent judgment lien because the
recording act did not apply to equitable interests.

2015

Glick v. Edwards, 803 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 2015). In a motion for
recusal in which the appellant sued every judge in the District of
Montana, the Ninth Circuit applied the rule of necessity and
held the rule permits a district judge to hear the case in which
he is named as a defendant where a litigant sues all the judges of
the district. The court cited Johnson v. Darr not as legal
precedent, but as an “unconventional option” to find
unconflicted judges: “For example, when all five members of
the Texas Supreme Court were disqualified from a case
involving Woodmen of the World because each justice was a
member of that fraternal organization, the governor appointed
a Special Supreme Court of three women to hear the case.”
Id. at 510 n.2.
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Year

Non-Texas State Court Cases

1925

Johns-Manville, Inc. v. Lander County, 240 P. 925 (Nev. 1925).
The court agreed that “when a right is solely and exclusively of
legislative creation, the courts will not extend the application of
the statute but will limit its application to the exact words of the
act,” citing Johnson v. Darr. Id. at 926.

1993

Blalak v. Mid Valley Transportation, Inc., 858 P.2d 683 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1993). An equitable title did not require recordation
under Texas recording statute, “the state from which our
recording statute was taken,” citing Johnson v. Darr. Id. at 686.

1996

Hunnicutt Construction, Inc. v. Stewart Title and Trust,
928 P.2d 725 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). Holding that an equitable
interest need not be recorded to prevail over a subsequent
judgment lien because the Arizona recording act does not apply
to equitable interests, citing Johnson v. Darr.

2014

In re Protest Appeals of Lyerla, 336 P.3d 882 (Kan. Ct. App.
2014). The court considered an attempt to require the recusal
of three Kansas Court of Tax Appeal judges and commented
there was a possibility additional pro tem judges may be
appointed to the court, citing as an example Johnson v. Darr,
“noting that case was decided entirely by pro tem judges after
all regularly appointed judges were disqualified.” Id. at 891.
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Year

Texas Supreme Court Cases

1932

Estelle v. Hart, 55 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. Comm’n. App. 1932).
Judgment lien did not attach to inherited land through
unrecorded instrument, reversing Hart v. Estelle, 34 S.W.2d
665, 671 (Tex. App.—Austin 1930), both of which cited Johnson
v. Darr.

1961

Second Injury Fund v. Keaton, 345 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1961).
“[W]e are not permitted to give a liberal construction where the
law is expressed in plain and unambiguous language as here.
We are not to look to the consequences of our action here in
limiting the application of the statute to the exact words of the
Act.” Id. at 714.

2008

Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433
(Tex. 2009). In a concurring opinion involving statutory
construction of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act,
Justice Nathan Hecht mentioned Johnson v. Darr in passing
within a parenthetical in a footnote: “(The most famous exercise
of the designation power was surely Governor Pat Neff’s
appointment of a Special Supreme Court consisting of three
women, Mrs. Hortense Ward, Special Chief Justice, and
Miss Ruth Virginia Brazzil and Miss Hattie L. Henenberg,
Special Associate Justices, to hear and determine the issues in
Johnson v. Darr, 114 Tex. 516, 272 S.W. 1098 (1925).).”
Id. at 492 n.11.
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Year

Texas Court of Appeals Cases

1927

Sugg v. Mozoch, 293 S.W. 907 (Tex. App.––Austin 1927, writ
ref’d). Quoting from Johnson v. Darr: “[t]he decisions of this state
uniformly hold that the registration statutes do not apply to
equitable titles. That bona fide purchasers for value are
protected against the assertion of such title is because of the
doctrine of estoppel, and not the registration statutes.”
Id. at 910.
Citizens’ Nat’l Bank v. Billingsley, 300 S.W. 648 (Tex. App.—
Waco 1927, writ ref’d) “It is also well-settled law that an
attaching creditor acquires no greater interest in land than that
owned by the debtor, except where the rule is abrogated by
reason of the registration statutes[,]” citing Johnson v. Darr.
Id. at 649.

1929

Brinkman v. Rick, 19 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1929, writ
ref’d). Stating appellees “can claim no greater interest in the
stock than the interest owned by J. George Brinkman at the time
the levies were made,” citing Johnson v. Darr. Id. at 812.

1930

Garrison v. Citizens’ Nat’l Bank, 25 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. App.—
Waco 1930, writ ref’d). “[T]he rights of the holder of an
equitable title were not affected by his failure to record a
conveyance to him of the legal title[,]” quoting Johnson v. Darr
Id. at 233.

1931

Gamer v. Love, 41 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1931,
writ dism’d w.o.j.). “[I]t seems to be definitely settled that a
judgment lien does not attach to an equitable title to realty
owned by the defendant, but only to realty which the debtor
holds by legal title[,]” quoting Johnson v. Darr. Id. at 359.

1932

South Texas Lumber Co. v. Nicoletti, 54 S.W.2d 893 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 1932, writ dism’d). “[T]hough an instrument
be entitled to registration, still it is not required to be recorded
in order to protect equitable title evidenced thereby against
attaching creditors[,]” citing Johnson v. Darr. Id. at 896.
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1937

Martin v. Marquardt, 111 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
1937, writ dism’d). “[S]tatement contained in this transfer was
false, and therefore this transfer was insufficient to put appellee
on notice of the fact that the appellant was, or might in the
future assert an equitable lien against this land[,]” citing Johnson
v. Darr. Id. at 286.

1938

Lusk v. Parmer, 114 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1938,
dism’d). No consideration given for land other than release or
credit upon debt and judgment, citing Johnson v. Darr.

1939

Broussard Trust v. Perryman, 134 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 1939, writ ref’d). Execution of affidavit before a
notary public that he held the “interest in the land in trust for”
another did not “have the effect of a legal conveyance of the
legal title to” the land to the beneficiary owner, citing Johnson v.
Darr. Id. at 314.

1940

Roeser & Pendleton, Inc. v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.,
138 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1940, writ ref’d).
Assertion of equitable claim to real property prevails against the
purchaser at execution sale, citing Johnson v. Darr and other cases.

1962

Hammett v. McIntire, 365 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. App.—Houston
1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Abstract of judgment lien did not attach
to beneficial interest in real property, citing Johnson v. Darr.

1964

Perry v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Conn., 380 S.W.2d 868 (Tex.
App.—Tyler 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Concluding that an agreed
statement of facts does not have to be signed and certified by
the court “where it otherwise appears from the record that the
case was tried upon such statement of facts,” citing the Darr civil
appeals opinion as affirmed by the Texas Supreme Court.
Id. at 876.

1972

Legate v. Bituminous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 483 S.W.2d 488
(Tex. App.—Beaumont 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Citing Johnson v.
Darr in a quote from Second Injury Fund v. Keaton.
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Texas Indus. Acc. Bd. v. Indus. Found., 526 S.W.2d 211 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 1975, pet. denied). “We are not to look to
the consequences of our action here in limiting the application
of the Act to the exact words of the Act,” citing Johnson v. Darr
and remarking: “This decision is the only one in our
jurisprudence decided by an all-woman Supreme Court of
Texas, a panel appointed by Governor Neff which sat during
the early months of Governor Miriam A. Ferguson’s first term
of office.” Id. at 218, 221 n.9.
Lewisville State Bank v. Blanton, 520 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. .App.—
Waco 1975), rev’d 525 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. App.—Waco 1975).
“The registration statutes do not apply to equitable titles, and
thus the equitable title of plaintiff is superior to judgment liens
held against W.H. Blanton,” citing Johnson v. Darr. Id. at 608.

1981

Jensen v. Bryson, 614 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1981,
no pet.). “The [recording] statute partially abrogates the
common law rule that a lien creditor is confined to the interest
of his debtor in the land at the time of levy; but, because the
statute is a legislative creation in derogation of the common law
and equitable principles, its application is limited to its exact
words[,]” citing Johnson v. Darr. Id. at 933.

1984

Milberg Factors, Inc. v. Hurwitz-Nordlicht Joint Venture,
676 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. App.—Austin 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
“[T]he assignment of interest was not subject to real property
recording requirements because Hurwitz’ interest was
personalty, not realty[,]” citing Johnson v. Darr. Id. at 616.

1985

Tex. Dept. of Pub. Safety v. Wiggins, 688 S.W.2d 227 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 1985, no pet.). “An expunction proceeding is
civil in nature rather than criminal, with the burden of proving
compliance with the statutory conditions resting solely with the
petitioner[,]” citing Johnson v. Darr. Id. at 229.
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1986

Tex. American Bank/Levelland v. Resendez, 706 S.W.2d 343
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 1986, no pet.). Stating “[S]ection 13.001
[of the Texas Property Code] (formerly article 6627) is a
legislative creation in derogation of the common law and
equitable principles and must be strictly construed,” citing
Johnson v. Darr. Id. at 345.

1990

Gibraltar Sav. Ass’n v. Martin, 784 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 1990, writ denied). Stating “[t]he statute partially
abrogates the common law rule that a lien creditor is confined
to the interest of his debtor in the land at the time of levy[,]”
citing Johnson v. Darr. Id. at 557.

1999

Gaona v. Gonzales, 997 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999).
“Because it is in derogation of the common law and equitable
principles, the recording statute must be strictly construed”[,]”
citing Johnson v. Darr. Id. at 786.

2003

Hellmann v. Circle C Props. I, Ltd., No. 04-03-00217-CV,
2003 WL 22897220 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, pet.
denied) (mem.). Citing Johnson v. Darr for the proposition that
“Texas courts have uniformly held that the recording statutes
do not apply to equitable titles; therefore, the absence of any
instrument recording AII’s equitable interest does not affect the
priority of the parties’ liens or make AII’s interest in the real
property void under section 13.001 of the Texas Property
Code.” Id. at *7.

2014

Drake Interiors, LLC v. Thomas, 433 S.W.3d 841 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). Citing Johnson v. Darr
for the proposition that if a lien attaches to property, the
lienholder may acquire an interest “no greater than that held by
the judgment debtor.” Id. at 847.

2016

Hankins v. Harris, 500 S.W.3d 140 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.). Citing Johnson v. Darr for the
proposition that a lienholder “acquire[s] an interest [in the
property] no greater than that held by the judgment debtor.”
Id. at 145.
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Year

Texas Attorney General Opinion

1969

Tex. Att’y. Gen. Op. No. M-507 (1969). Attorney General
Crawford C. Martin cited Johnson v. Darr in Opinion No. M-507
(Nov. 6, 1969) for the proposition that when “a right is solely
and exclusively of Legislative creation, and does not derive its
existence from the common law or principles of equity, and
creates a new right by statute, the courts will not extend the
application of the statute, but will limit its application to the
exact words of the act.” Id.
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